本文原載2012年11月10日《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》，觀察者網(wǎng)譯

世界上最大的兩個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體本月都在經(jīng)歷最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的換屆，這種巧合被西方媒體描述為一個(gè)不透明的共產(chǎn)黨國家與一個(gè)透明的大眾民主國家的鮮明對(duì)比。

這種對(duì)比是非常膚淺的，它實(shí)際上涉及的是兩種政治模式之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)：一種是更強(qiáng)調(diào)選賢任能的模式，另一種則迷信選票的模式。相比之下，中國選賢任能的模式可能勝出。

中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡已為世界關(guān)注，但中國政治制度的改革卻沒有引起足夠的注意，這也可能是由于意識(shí)形態(tài)的原因而被故意忽視了。事實(shí)上，中國毫不張揚(yáng)地推進(jìn)了國家治理方面的許多重要改革，中國已經(jīng)建立了從上倒下的一整套可以被稱為“選拔加選舉”的制度：大體來說，干部晉升必須經(jīng)過初步考察、征求意見、內(nèi)部評(píng)估、較小范圍內(nèi)的投票等程序來選出能干的，有民望的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。就此來看，中國共產(chǎn)黨可能已成為今天世界上最重視選賢任能的組織之一。

這種選賢任能的制度，深深地扎根于中國儒家淵源流長的政治文化傳統(tǒng)。這種傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)生并維持了上千年的科舉制度，科舉制度無疑是世界歷史上最早的以公開考試的方式來選拔官員的制度。

中國繼承了這種傳統(tǒng)，并將其貫徹到整個(gè)體制中，盡管這種努力并非總是成功的。官員晉升的考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，涵蓋了消除貧困、創(chuàng)造就業(yè)、地方經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)發(fā)展，以及最近越來越受重視的環(huán)境保護(hù)等。中國過去30多年的迅速崛起，與這種選賢任能的制度是分不開的。盡管有不少聳人聽聞的腐敗丑聞和社會(huì)問題，但總體而言，中國的政治制度，正如其經(jīng)濟(jì)一樣，保持了彈性和活力。

在體制建設(shè)方面，中國共產(chǎn)黨在各個(gè)級(jí)別上已經(jīng)確立了嚴(yán)格的退休年齡和任期制。中共中央總書記、國家主席和政府總理，最多只能任兩屆，總共10年。在最高層，中共中央政治局實(shí)行集體領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，這有效防止了文化大革命期間出現(xiàn)過的個(gè)人崇拜問題。

這些精心設(shè)計(jì)的改革消除了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人權(quán)力終身制的危險(xiǎn)，而權(quán)力終身制正是引發(fā)阿拉伯之春的一個(gè)主要原因。目前正在舉行的中國共產(chǎn)黨十八大，將產(chǎn)生中國新一代的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，這無疑是對(duì)中國選賢任能制度的最好詮釋。

中國最高決策機(jī)構(gòu)，即中共中央政治局常委的候選人幾乎都擔(dān)任過兩任省委書記或具有其它相應(yīng)的工作歷練。在中國，治理一個(gè)省的工作，對(duì)主政者才干和能力的要求非常之高，因?yàn)橹袊粋€(gè)省的平均規(guī)模幾乎是歐洲四、五個(gè)國家的規(guī)模。很難想像在中國這種選賢任能的制度下，像美國小布什和日本野田佳彥這樣低能的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人能夠進(jìn)入國家最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層。

以即將接班的中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人習(xí)近平為例，他曾在經(jīng)濟(jì)充滿活力的福建擔(dān)任省長，后又擔(dān)任過民營經(jīng)濟(jì)高度發(fā)達(dá)的浙江省委書記，其后又擔(dān)任過上海市委書記，上海是中國的金融和商業(yè)中心，還有許多強(qiáng)大的國有企業(yè)。換言之，在習(xí)近平擔(dān)任中央政治局常委之前，他主政過的地區(qū)，就人口而言，超過1.2億，就經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模而言，超過印度。其后他又有5年時(shí)間，以國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的身份來熟悉整個(gè)國家層面的政治、軍事等領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)工作。

中國選賢任能的制度挑戰(zhàn)了“民主或?qū)Ｖ?rdquo;這種陳舊的二分法。從中國的視角看，一個(gè)政權(quán)的性質(zhì)及其合法性，應(yīng)該由其實(shí)質(zhì)內(nèi)容來判斷，這種實(shí)質(zhì)內(nèi)容就是能否實(shí)行良政善治、能否擁有勤政能干的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人、能否使多數(shù)民眾感到滿意。盡管中國政府還存有許多不足，但它確實(shí)保證了世界上最高的經(jīng)濟(jì)長期增長并大大改善了絕大部分國民的生活水平。根據(jù)美國皮尤調(diào)查中心的民調(diào)，在2012年受訪的中國民眾中，高達(dá)82%的人對(duì)自己的未來表示樂觀，這一比例遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過其他參與調(diào)查的國家。

亞伯拉罕·林肯的理想是“民有、民治、民享”的政府，但在現(xiàn)實(shí)中這一理想并非輕易可及。美國的民主制度距林肯的理想還相距遙遠(yuǎn)，否則諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)得主約瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨就不會(huì)公開譴責(zé)美國的制度是“1%有、1%治、1%享”。當(dāng)然，“1%”的說法也可能過于嚴(yán)厲了。

中國已成為世界上最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)和政治的改革的實(shí)驗(yàn)室。中國這種“選拔加選舉”的模式已經(jīng)可以和美國的選舉民主模式進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

溫斯頓·丘吉爾有一句名言：“民主是最壞的制度，但其他人類已嘗試的制度更壞”。在西方的文化背景中，情況可能確實(shí)如此。許多中國人將丘吉爾的這句名言意譯為“最不壞的制度”，也就是中國偉大戰(zhàn)略家孫子所說的“下下策”，它至少可以保證壞領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的出局。然而，在中國儒家選賢任能的政治傳統(tǒng)中，政府應(yīng)該永遠(yuǎn)追求“上上策”或“最最好”的目標(biāo)，力求選拔出最卓越的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。這當(dāng)然很難做到，但這種努力不會(huì)停止。

中國通過政治制度上的創(chuàng)新，已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了一種制度安排，這種制度安排在很大程度上實(shí)現(xiàn)了“上上策”（選出久經(jīng)考驗(yàn)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人）與“下下策”（保證壞領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人出局）的結(jié)合。

附：英文原版

Meritocracy vs. Democracy

By Zhang Weiwei

BEIJING

The world’s two largest economies are both revealing their next leaders this month, and this coincidence has been depicted in the Western media as a sharp contrast between an opaque Communist state and a transparent populous democracy.

But beneath this superficial contrast is a competition between two political models, one based more on meritocratic leadership and the other on popular election. And the Chinese model may win.

While China’s dramatic economic rise has attracted global attention, its political and institutional changes have been little noticed or deliberately ignored for ideological reasons.

In fact, without much fanfare, Beijing has introduced significant reforms into its way of governance and established an elaborate system of what can be called ‘‘selection plus election.’’ Briefly, competent leaders are selected based on merit and popular support through a vigorous process of screening, opinion surveys, internal evaluations and various small-scale elections. The Communist Party of China may arguably be one of the world’s most meritocratic institutions.

Meritocratic governance is deeply-rooted in China’s Confucian political tradition, which among other things allowed the country to develop and sustain for well over a millennium the Keju system, the world’s first public exam process for selecting officials.

Consistent with this tradition, Beijing practices — not always successfully — meritocracy across the whole political stratum. Criteria such as performance in poverty eradication, job creation, local economic and social development, and, increasingly, cleaner environment are key factors in the promotion of local officials. China’s dramatic rise over the past three decades is inseparable from this meritocratic system.

Sensational scandals of official corruption and other social woes aside, China’s governance, like the Chinese economy, remains resilient and robust.

On the institutional front, the Party has introduced a strict mandatory retirement age and term limits at all levels. The general secretary, president and prime minister now serve a maximum of two terms of office, or 10 years. Collective leadership is practiced within the Politburo in part to prevent the type of the personality cult we witnessed during the Cultural Revolution.

These carefully designed changes have eliminated any possibility of permanent entrenchment of power in the hands of any individual leader (which was a major cause of the Arab Spring).

Nothing can better illustrate this meritocratic governance than the line-up of the next generation of Chinese leaders to be unveiled at the 18th Party Congress now in session.

Virtually all the candidates for the Standing Committee of the Party, China’s highest decision-making body, have served at least twice as a party secretary of a Chinese province or at similar managerial positions. It takes extraordinary talent and skills to govern a typical Chinese province, which is on average the size of four to five European states.

Indeed, with the Chinese system of meritocracy in place, it is inconceivable that people as weak and incompetent as George W. Bush or Yoshihiko Noda of Japan could ever get to the top leadership position.

Take the incoming leader, Xi Jingping, as an example. Xi served as the governor of Fujian Province, a region known for its dynamic economy, and as party secretary of Zhejiang province, which is renowned for its thriving private sector, and Shanghai, China’s financial and business hub with a powerful state-sector.

In other words, prior to taking his current position as the heir apparent to President Hu Jintao, Xi had in fact managed areas with total population of over 120 million and an economy larger than India’s. He was then given another five years to serve as vice president to get familiar with running state and military affairs at the national level.

China’s meritocracy challenges the stereotypical dichotomy of democracy v. autocracy. From Beijing’s point of view, the nature of a state, including its legitimacy, has to be defined by its substance: good governance, competent leadership and success in satisfying the citizenry.

Notwithstanding its many deficiencies, the Chinese government has ensured the world’s fastest growing economy and vastly improved living standards for most people. According to the Pew Research Center, 82 percent of Chinese surveyed in 2012 feel optimistic about their future, topping all other countries surveyed.

Indeed, Abraham Lincoln’s ideal of ‘‘government of the people, by the people, for the people,’’ is by no means easy to achieve, and American democracy is far from meeting this objective. Otherwise the Nobel economics laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz would not have decried, in perhaps too critical a tone, that the U.S. system is now ‘‘of the 1 percent, by the 1 percent, and for the 1 percent.’’

China has become the world’s largest laboratory for economic, social and political change, and China’s model of ‘‘selection plus election,’’ is in a position now to compete with the U.S. model of electoral democracy.

Winston Churchill’s famous dictum — ‘‘democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried’’ — may be true in the Western cultural context. Many Chinese even paraphrase Churchill’s remark into what China’s great strategist Sun Tzu called ‘‘xiaxiace,’’ or ‘‘the least bad option,’’ which allows for the exit of bad leaders.

However, in China’s Confucian tradition of meritocracy, a state should always strive for what’s called ‘‘shangshangce,’’ or ‘‘the best of the best’’ option by choosing leaders of the highest caliber. It’s not easy, but efforts in this direction should never cease.

China’s political and institutional innovations so far have produced a system that has in many ways combined the best option of selecting well-tested leaders and the least bad option of ensuring the exit of bad leaders.

Zhang Weiwei is a professor of international relations at Fudan University and senior fellow at Chunqiu Institute. He is the author of ‘‘The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State.’’

（International Herald Tribune/New York Times, 10 Nov. 2012）